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ABSTRACT
CHRISTOPHER FARICY: Congressional Committee Requests Revisited: Professional 
Expertise, Multiple Goals and Representation
(Under the direction of Erik Engstrom)
House members pursue multiple goals during their legislative career. The goals of 
reelection, good policy making and power affect member voting and committee 
composition. Yet in arguably a legislator’s most important choice, committee request, 
only the goal of reelection has empirical support. I argue that a member utilizes all three 
goals when going through the committee process and requests a committee assignment 
that will maximize their utility across all legislative goals. Utility maximization is 
achieved when a member can gain influence within a policy jurisdiction through 
leveraging their prior expertise.  
I employ a multinomial logit model in examining committee requests, for eight
committees over fifty years. My findings indicate that across five of the eight committees 
a member’s prior occupation is a strong and consistent predictor of a legislator’s request. 
It is plausible, given the results that members pursue multiple goals in making their 
request for committee assignment.
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Introduction
One of the most significant contributions of positive theory to the study of politics is the 
finding that institutions within legislatures are endogenous (Riker 1980). House members 
have preferences over policy outcomes and these preferences determine the structuring of 
institutions in Congress. Therefore choices that members make over committees, rules, and 
procedures are attempts to facilitate legislative outcomes in their favor. There are three 
typologies of member goals that rotate depending on the member and situation: reelection, 
“good” policy making and power within the House (Fenno 1973). This categorization of 
member goals has been utilized to classify the types of committees in the United States 
House of Representatives. Members that are interested primarily in re-election seek 
assignment to constituency committees (Agriculture, Merchant Marines and Fishery), 
legislators driven to be influential in policy outcomes desire policy committees (Judiciary, 
Education and Labor) and House members concerned with gaining power request 
assignment on the control committees (Ways and Means, Appropriations).1
    A House member’s motivation in seeking assignment for committee is a window into 
their career goals and a predictor of legislative behavior. The wealth of literature on the 
committee assignment process has produced multiple theories of how House member’s 
career goals shape legislative organization. Previous research extols the importance of 
1 Smith, Steven S. and Christopher J. Deering. 1983. “Changing Motives for Committee Preferences of New 
Members of the U.S. House” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.8, No.2, pp.271-281
2party, constituency interests and information in determining member requests and 
committee composition (Rohde 1991, Ferejohn, 1974 and Krehbiel 1991). The findings in 
most of these works support the hypothesis that legislators consider their constituents when 
requesting committee assignments. The other two member goals, of “good” policy making 
and power, have not been thoroughly tested to determine their influence on member 
requests. As other scholars have noted, the three major theories of Congressional behavior 
are often more in chorus then they are conflict. (Shepsle and Weingast 1995, Hurwitz, 
Moiles and Rohde 2001). If multiple goals are active in any legislative decision; then we 
should witness more then just reelection factors being considered by legislators requesting 
a committee assignment. 
    Do members universally look to constituency interests in choosing committee 
assignments or do personal policy preferences and a desire for power factor into their 
revealed preferences for committee work? In this study, I attempt to unveil the role that 
personal policy preferences and the desire for influence play in the legislative decision 
making process. I employ unique data sets of committee requests and representatives prior 
occupations in examining committee requests for eight congressional committees over fifty 
years. The initial results indicate that members are cognizant of multiple goals when 
requesting committees and this, in part, creates multidimensional committees. These 
findings have direct implications for what stimulates individual member behavior and how 
members of Congress design legislative institutions to serve their goals.
3Member Preferences over Committees and Theories of Congressional Organization
    The three main theories of Congressional organization: distributive, party and 
informational, have provided numerous empirical tests of legislative behavior. The 
motivations or goals of House members that stem from these theories are to seek reelection
(Weingast and Marshall 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993) and favorable policy outcomes 
(Krehbiel 1991). 
    These theories present differentiated arguments for what motivates House members in 
congressional decision making, from their initial committee request to the final roll-call 
votes. The distributive theory of congressional committees (Ferejohn, 1974, Weingast and 
Marshall 1988) claims that members request committee assignments based primarily on 
constituency interests. Committees with varying preferences from the floor median, 
participate in an aggregated exchange that allows gains from legislative trading. 2 The 
major party theories attributed to Rohde (1991), as well as Cox and McCubbins (1993)
assume exogenous member preferences, for reelection and constituency concerns, and 
endogenous ones, such as party pressure. The legislative consequence of party organization 
is that committees produce bills that align with the majority party’s median member. Keith 
Krehbiel’s (1991) informational theory of legislative organization argues that the House of 
Representatives is a majoritarian body that places members on committees in order to gain 
specialized information. In Krehbiel’s theory, members are
2 Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern 
House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
4matched by their expertise with a committees’ jurisdiction so that they can construct low 
cost, high value legislation that aligns with the preferences of the floor median.3
    Although the informational theory recognizes reelection as an important legislative goal, 
the individual goals of House members are deemphasized and committee assignments are 
treated as a collective process.  This is where there is tension in Krehbiel’s analysis of the
committee assignment process. He claims that members are motivated by the “values, 
needs and wants of the electorate” yet final committee composition is conducted by a 
“legislature that appoints to committees members who can specialize”; the exogenous goal 
does not match the endogenous committee structure (1991 77,136). Why would rational 
members, interested in electoral benefits, create institutions that focus on specialization 
rather then constituency interests? As Rick Hall (1995) noted the informational theory 
deals with this inconsistently by “smuggling a bit of distributional theory back in. The 
committee specialist gets a “greater payoff”, a “distributional commission” or a 
“distributional bonus” in return for working in a committee area that may not have any 
electoral relevance to the member. Here in lies the rub, do members receive a “payoff” for 
the policy specialization they work so hard to develop through committee work? I argue 
that members do receive a “payoff” for policy specialization in the form of influence 
within the House of Representatives.
The Role of Professional Expertise in Requesting Committee Assignments
    We have noted that House members have multiple goals, yet empirically only reelection 
is supported as a motivation for committee requests. If Congressional scholars agree that 
3 Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization. 1991. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan 
Press.
5all legislators are motivated by reelection, “good” policy making and power then why 
would political professionals only consider one of these goals when making, arguably, 
their most important career decision? 
    I offer a different interpretation of how member motivations influence their requests for 
committee assignments that utilize aspects of three legislative incentives. House members, 
as rational and strategic actors, attempt to maximize their utility in making committee 
requests that are a function of multiple goals and not just reelection. If members are found 
to operationalize all three goals in committee requests then the organization of committees 
that follows would create multidimensional policy space within each committee. A recent 
study concluded that members on the Agricultural committee demonstrate voting behavior 
that reflects the multidimensionality of committee jurisdictions and legislative preferences
(Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde 2001). And as Smith and Deering (1983) concluded, “mixed 
motives are the norm rather then the exception for both members and committees”. 
    A major claim of the distributional and informational theories is that member 
preferences are driven primarily by reelection.  Adler and Lapinski (1997) present a robust 
test of this argument by examining the composition of committees against the “needs” for 
the committee’s policy in a member’s district. They find that many committees, both 
policy and reelection orientated, are composed of “high need” members. These results 
support the distributive theory of committee assignment in which members self-select onto 
committees in order to receive gains from the exchange of “private” legislative goods.4 A 
substantial aspect of a member’s request reflects their desire for reelection by meeting 
constituency demands through committee work. 
4
 The validity of self-selection is constantly under debate and will not be addressed in this paper other then to 
postulate that a nontrivial percentage of members have there requests honored by House and Party leaders in 
the committee assignment process. 
6    The various attempts to capture a legislator’s ideology have proven difficult given that it 
is a latent set of policy preferences. The inability to measure personal policy preferences 
has inhibited our observations of members requesting committees for policy purposes. 
Studies have attempted this measure using member surveys, elite surveys, roll call voting 
and interest group scores; each of which is problematic. The surveys are not able to be 
issued consistently over time and interest group ratings only measure a subset of policy. 
The most popular measure of member ideology, NOMINATE scores, suffer endogeneity 
problems.5 It is difficult to parse out party influences from personal preferences from 
constituency interests in analyzing roll call votes. Although the second dimension of 
NOMINATE scores may indicate personal ideology, the first dimension captures most of 
the variation.6 In this study, I use a member’s past professional career as a proxy for their 
broad personal preference for a policy area. Representatives have ideological goals 
separate from their constituency and make policy choices based on these preferences 
(Evans 2001). Prior occupation is by no means fully representative of a member’s vested 
interest in a policy jurisdiction, nevertheless it has many advantages. 
    First, past professional experience is truly an exogenous measure of a member’s interest 
that in no manner is tainted by constituency or party pressures. In fact a person’s career is 
likely to inform their choice of political party and personal ideology. It is not hard to 
imagine a successful agribusiness woman from a farming district choosing to run for a 
House seat; since she shares personal policy interests with the majority of her potential 
constituents.  Secondly, sociology research has demonstrated that a person’s values and 
5
 NOMINATE scoring is a method of analysis for party and ideological voting developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal (1985).
6
 In a number of studies the first dimension captures around 70% of the total variation (Cox and McCubbins 
1993). 
7beliefs are reflected and acted out in their career choice (King 2000). As Hall (1996) notes, 
“An aide to a junior member of the House Agriculture Committee attributed his boss's 
active involvement in commodities exchange regulations to his experience as a 
commodities broker. Another agriculture member mentioned his experience as a public 
advocate for the poor in discussing his interest in international hunger relief and domestic 
nutrition issues. And a member of the House Commerce Committee observed that "it was 
only natural' that he get involved in the fight over oil and gas deregulation, given his 
background as a consumer advocate”.  If a member is choosing to do committee work that 
reflects their values they are likely to bear the substantial costs that go into putting together 
a bill and navigating it through the chamber.  Therefore, a member’s personal policy 
preference, as represented by prior job experience, can predict which members will want to 
do the heavy lifting involved in becoming a policy specialist.  
    The third goal of a representative in making a committee request is to gain influence 
within the chamber. Influence, as it is used here, operates differently then the legislative 
goal of institutional power. A legislator interested in formal power would seek assignment 
to the Rules, Ways and Means or Appropriations committee, none of which are included in 
this analysis. Influence is the informal power of a legislator that is created by the member 
through the process of policy specialization. Through policy specialization a representative 
earns the prestige and reputation as being one of a select few that can move policy in a 
certain direction within the chamber through their expertise. Influence is the “payoff” or 
“distributional benefit” discussed in the informational theory that members receive for 
their efforts in becoming low cost policy specialists in committee. Krehbiel admits 
“occupational variables are very good measures- perhaps the best measure- of low cost 
8specialization” (1991 136). Legislators align their area of expertise with a committee that 
offers similar specialized resources (committee staff, specialized jurisdiction, interest 
group access and hearings) to gain influence within a narrow policy area. A past study 
provides support for this assumption: "a (congressional) staff member explained that his 
boss had no desire to serve on a committee that would necessitate learning a new subject. 
Two others asked for committees handling topics with which they worked as local office 
holders, and two wanted to continue working on items they had handled while holding 
statewide office".7 A House member that develops policy influence can use this to create 
particularized legislative benefits for her constituents or to trade with other members across 
committees. 
    The member goal of policy influence is activated when Congress operates under a 
hybrid model of the distributional and informational theories. The committee system is 
structured to encourage policy specialization and members use their specialization in trades 
for personalized benefits (Weingast and Marshall 1988). In this way the legislature 
operates in a similar fashion to an international market of trade. In the Ricardian model of 
comparative advantage countries have differentiated allocation of resources.8 These 
countries have heterogeneous consumer demands that can not be efficiently meet through 
the production of goods just using a country’s domestic resources. Therefore, they choose 
to specialize in production based primarily on the unique resources available to their 
industry. A country’s synthesis of unique resources and concentrated production allows 
7 Bullock, Charles S. III.1976. "Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: Freshman of the 
92nd Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly 1:201-212
8
 The philosopher and economist David Ricardo is created for the creation of the comparative advantage 
theory of international trade. 
9them to sell selected goods at a relative lower price and use the surplus production for 
trade. 
    In my analogy, incoming House members evaluate their personal resources, such as 
professional experience and expertise, and decide to specialize in the production of 
legislation in an area in which they can quickly gain a comparative advantage over other 
members in the House. A comparative advantage by definition allows someone to produce 
more legislative products with equal or lesser resources then a competitor. A legislator 
faces various consumer demands (Party leaders, the floor median, and constituents) and 
has at her disposal a unique set of resources (professional expertise). Since a member can 
not divide her time and efforts equally or efficiently in meeting the various demands, she 
concentrates in the specialization of one policy area that is of personal interest and reflects 
her past experience. A member that chooses a committee based on personal interest and 
expertise is better able to use the committee staff, committee jurisdiction, and access to 
interest groups in creating policy influence that is recognized by both their constituents 
(through credit claiming) and other legislators (in trading). This moves us forward in 
solving the collective action problem left from Krehbiel’s informational theory: Why 
would members spend their time specializing in committee policy if the benefits are 
captured by the House’s median member?9 One possible explanation is that the primary 
benefits are captured by the individual member and not the floor median. 
9
 This question was asked in Rick Halls’ article “Empiricism and Progress in Positive Theories of Legislative 
Institutions” (1995)
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Data and Methodology
I employ a multinomial logit model that combines the theoretical and methodological 
postulates of rational choice theory. Each House member is operationalized as a rational 
actor faced with a probabilistic choice over seven different committees.10 The seven 
committees represent both constituency and policy interests and in order are: Agriculture, 
Armed Services, Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Education and Labor, Interior, 
Energy and Commerce, and Public Works and Transportation. The multinomial model 
treats each observation as a utility maximizer, their utility contains two elements: personal, 
such as personal policy interests and the desire for influence, and categorical, in that each 
committee has various benefits to a member’s constituency needs. Additionally, each 
choice has random and probabilistic components that represent the uncertainty in how a 
member’s request will be received by the party leadership.11
    This is one of the few studies that tests member goals in Congress by examining 
committee requests. The majority of literature of the committee assignment process 
explores committee’s final composition (Adler and Lapinski 1997, Hall 1996). Studies that 
do utilize member requests have tested committee desirability (Rhode and Shepsle 1973, 
Munger 1988), preference outliers (Shepsle 1978) or party loyalty (Cox and McCubbins 
1993).  The data used in this study includes both freshman requests and transfer requests, 
10
 The power and other smaller committees are not included. The power committees have too heterogeneous 
a policy jurisdiction to examine without focusing on the sub-committee level, which is a future project. 
11 House members, especially freshman, are uncertain just how the various committee jurisdictions fit with 
their policy and careers goals. Additionally, committee’s have heterogeneous policy areas, members have 
numerous interested constituencies and multiple legislative goals. Finally, member requests are colored by 
the availability of committee, the committee’s prestige and are only honored sporadically.
11
both of which are the revealed preferences of members for a particular policy jurisdiction. 
Only a member’s first request is used in order to provide a strict test of personal ideology.                                 
    A member’s request is not a perfect reflection of a member’s preferences since their 
request represents, in part, the probability that they will receive the requested assignment 
(Shepsle 1978). Additionally, the data results can not communicate in which direction a 
member wants policy to move. Yet, if members are requesting committee assignments 
based off their prior occupations then we have information on which members will seek to 
be influential within specific policy areas. And since power in the House is fragmented, 
largely along the line of committee jurisdictional boundaries, understanding the swath of 
legislators with the prior ability and desire to affect a policy area informs our 
understanding of policy outcomes. 
    The model as applied here, tests the preferences of members over seven committees 
from 1947-1997. The data set includes close to 1,000 observations that contain all the 
necessary categories in order to test over 26 variables. In a multinominal logit model the 
dependent variable is a collection of dummied choices, in this study a legislator’s choice 
for one of seven different committees.12 These committees are of theoretical interest in that 
they represent committees such as Agriculture, known to attract members interested in 
serving their district and Judiciary, which is primarily a policy-making committee with 
little re-elective benefit. If my hypothesis is correct that members utilize multiple goals in 
selecting committees then we would expect both a representative’s prior occupation and 
constituency interests to be significant predictors. 
12
 The interior committee was originally included but dropped out when no member recorded having a prior 
profession that related to the interior committees jurisdiction.
12
    The first set of independent variables represents personal policy preferences and the 
utility of influence; this is represented by a member’s previous occupation. It is important 
to note that Shepsle discovered a correlation between prior occupation and committee 
requests in 1978.13  Keith Krehbiel (1991) notes, "in the eight equations reported in 
Shepsle's table 4.4, the only types of variables that are consistently strong and significant 
are not those pertaining to constituency characteristics but rather those pertaining to 
members' occupations. The best predictor of Agriculture requests is "farm-related 
occupational background." The best predictor of Banking and Currency requests is 
"financial or real estate occupational background." Similarly, education or labor 
occupational backgrounds are the only significant predictors to the Education and Labor 
Committee, and being a lawyer is the only significant predictor of requests to Judiciary" 
(1991, pp.135-136). The data for House member’s prior career were obtained from the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. There are 46 different 
occupations identified in the ICPSR data and occupations were categorized together in to 
embody a legislator’s personal preference for a policy area (Table 1A).  For example, any 
member that previously was an urban planner, economist, accountant, CEO, banker, or 
social worker is qualified as having an occupation related to the policy jurisdiction of the 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs committee. The data set includes occupational listings 
for every member that ever served in Congress and when combined with Kelly and 
Frisch’s request data result in over 10,000 observations across seventy years. 
    The second set of independent variables are committee characteristics as represented by 
Adler and Lipinski’s census data that identifies salient electoral characteristics relating to 
13 Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern 
House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
13
each committee’s policy area. As stated in their article on committee outliers these data 
were created “to determine which constituencies or characteristics of the electoral district 
would have a compelling interest in the authority of specific committees” (Adler and 
Lipinski, p.897, 1997).  For example, a member would be more likely to select the 
Agriculture committee if their district had a significant number of constituents involved in 
agriculture or large swaths of farm land. There are 18 variables used to represent the 
constituency interests of seven different committees (Table 1B). The variables range from 
the number of union members in a district to the number of school children enrolled in 
public schools to major military installments. The model contains seven dependent 
variables as symbolized by the committee requests and 26 independent variables.There is a 
range of constituency variables, with the Agriculture and Public Works and Transportation 
having a minimum of two predictors and Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs containing a 
total of six. An example being that a member hypothesized to have constituents concerned 
in the Armed Services committee will report a high number of military installments, major 
military installments and a large military population. There are similar predictors for each 
of the committees represented in this study. The first model tests to determine if a 
member’s prior occupation correlates with committee requests. The second model includes 
both prior occupation and constituency variables. 
Results and Analysis
The findings indicate support for the hypothesis that prior profession helps predict 
committee requests. The odds ratio coefficients are robust and consistent across five of the 
seven committees. In the Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking, Finance and Urban 
14
Affairs, Education and Labor and Judiciary committees only the occupational predictor of 
interest is a significant cause. Interestingly, the variables that represent district and 
constituency interests performed inconsistently.14
    In the second table, just the occupations were regressed onto the committee choice of 
close to 1,000 members from 1947-1997. The occupational categories, that are theorized to 
encompass a member’s expertise and policy interest, achieve significance in over 70% of 
the committee cases. The Interior committee is the baseline for all the tables in this section. 
In a multinomial logit, the coefficients are to be interpreted as odds ratios, so the values 
represent the chances of making a request as a legislator moves from an interior occupation 
to an occupation of interest.15 For example, in Table 1 as a member moves from an interior 
occupation to being a lawyer they are over eleven times more likely to request the 
Judiciary committee over other committees. In examining requests for the Agriculture 
committee, having a past career in agriculture is significant and proved eight times more 
influential in requesting the Agriculture committee over other assignments. The Armed 
Services committee produces the expected results in that members with past experience as 
a ranked solider or military officer have greater odds of requesting the committee then 
those members without military service experience. The Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs committee requests presents a clear picture, in that the only the significant predictor 
for requesting this committee, is having been involved in a banking or urban related 
occupation. In examining the results for the Education and Labor Committee, coming from 
an education or labor background demonstrated the most significance, causing a member 
14
 This is predominantly due to the violation of the IIA assumption and not to lack of constituency influence 
for committee requests. 
15
 The Interior professions were businesses related to energy, and forest services along with environmental 
professions. 
15
to be more then 12 times more likely to request the Education and Labor committee, as 
compared to being in law which also increased the odds of selection. Finally in Table 2, 
the Energy and Commerce and Public Works and Transportation columns reported no 
variables of significance. This could be due to a misspecification of occupations that relate 
to those committee’s policy jurisdictions, the lack of committee desirability, or an 
insufficient amount of observations for those two committees. The business occupations 
used for the Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs committee could also be relevant to 
Energy and Commerce and Public Works and Transportation.  This model was absent of 
any predictors for district interests. The next set of models includes variables that represent 
constituency interests as well as legislators prior occupations.
    In this multinomial logit regression there are still seven committee choices for which 
members can make a request but now I have added a total of 26 independent variables that 
include not only the occupation predictors discussed previously, but 18 new variables that 
represent constituency interests in the policy jurisdictions of the various committees. The 
results of this model were complex and protracted to say the least; there is one table for all 
the committee choices with 26 different odds ratio coefficients and a constant for each one. 
I choose to report the variables of theoretical interest and variables that displayed statistical 
significance.16 Most interestingly, the constituency predictors perform moderately, while 
all the occupational variables retain their significance and stout. In the full model of the 
Agriculture committee (Table 3) agricultural occupation maintains significance along with 
the number of farmers within a member’s district. In Table 4, the number of major military 
installations along with the percentage of the population employed by the military was 
16
 The full tables were not included in that most of the variables listed are not of interest and placing these in 
would have eaten up at least 15 pages of just tables.  
16
significant in predicting the Armed Services committee – again the occupational variables 
hold their saliency. This pattern is repeated in five out of the seven committees, in which 
some district characteristics as well as the occupational variables demonstrate predictive 
power for member’s committee requests. 
    In further analysis of this model it became apparent that the Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA), necessary in multinomial logit, was violated by 
the introduction of the constituency variables.17 The IIA postulate is “that if new 
alternatives become available, then all probabilities for the prior choices must adjust in 
precisely in order to retain the original odds” (Long 1997, 183). Therefore some 
representatives may have very weak preferences over the seven committee choices.  By 
definition the constituency variables correlate with one another to represent a latent “need” 
for that committee’s jurisdiction a district population.18 Additionally, the constituency 
variables are raw numbers and not percentages so larger districts are weighted higher in 
most categories. Secondly, the number of observations drops from 999 in the first model to 
634 in the full model and there is no certainty that the decrease was nonsystematic. These 
concerns provide little confidence in being able to interpret the results of the second 
model.19
Conclusion
    Ambitious women and men sacrifice much to run and win election into the House of 
Representatives. Once they have won, they desire to have influence within the chamber so 
17
 I ran a Hausman test and the negative test statistic of -75.12 indicates that the IIA assumption in violated.
18
 I ran a series of Pearson’s correlations on variables that were connected by committee such as the number 
of farmers and amount of rural farmland and they were all highly correlated. 
19
 The only good news is the degrees of freedom from having 26 variables helps support the occupational 
coefficients in that the low df’s raises the bar in being able to receive significant coefficients.
17
they may successfully pursue the goals of re-election, constructing “good” policy and 
gaining institutional power. The difficulty for an individual member is that 434 other 
strategic actors desire the same broad legislative outcomes for themselves. The 
engagement of multiple goals in the committee process results in multidimensional 
committees that are malleable and can be shaped to serve the committee members needs as 
they arise.  
    These results prove damming for the informational theory of committee assignment. The 
data here strongly indicate that members lean heavily on their past professional experience 
when requesting committee work. They are not assigned to committees by House leaders 
to be low cost specialists, instead they choose to be low cost specialists in order to better 
position themselves to create and trade personalized legislative benefits.
    If a legislator’s previous experience is in some way a proxy for their broad policy 
interests these results could potentially be additional support for the “policy outlier” line of 
congressional literature. The next stage of this research will be to test the hypothesis that 
members requesting committees aligned with their previous occupation are more likely to 
have their request honored then members making a request based on other factors. 
    I argue that a theory of legislative influence can augment the existing three theories of 
Congressional organization. Along with predicting the success of committee requests it has 
the potential to explain which members are active in the committee mark up process and 
navigating committee bills through the chamber. In building off the work of Richard Hall, 
it could be theorized that members with an informational comparative advantage would be 
more inclined to participate in the complexity of bill construction and feel more efficacious 
in representing the committee with non members in negotiating the bill through conference 
18
committee. Additionally, I would expect to find that not only do interest groups lobby 
committees that share the same preferences but also that share the same previous 
occupation and policy expertise (Kollman, 1997). Decisions are made by those who show 
up and in Congress policy is made by those who show up with relevant expertise in 
specific policy making areas. 
19
Table 1: Personal Policy Variables for Seven Committees from 1947 - 1997
Agriculture Armed 
Services
Banking, 
Finance 
and Urban 
Affairs
Education 
and Labor
Energy and 
Commerce
Judiciary Public Works 
and 
Transportation
Agriculture 
Business
Military 
Officer
Urban 
Planner
Teacher Advertising Lawyer Engineer
Farming 
Business
Ranked 
Solider
Accountant High School 
Administrator
Manufacturer 
Business
Policy 
Analyst
Transportation 
Business
Economist College 
Administrator
Retailing 
Business
Political 
Activist
Contractor
Social 
Worker
Professor Petroleum/Mining 
Business
Journalist
Investments Librarian Communication 
Company 
Executive
Minister
Banking Laborer CEO Party 
Officer
Insurance Union Officer Political 
Consultant
CEO Educational 
Administrator
School 
Counselor
20
Table 2: Constituency Variables for Seven Committees from 1947 - 1997
Agriculture Armed 
Services
Banking, 
Finance 
and Urban 
Affairs
Education 
and Labor
Energy and 
Commerce
Judiciary Public Works 
and 
Transportation
Farmer -
number of 
persons 
identifying 
employment 
in farming
Military 
Installations 
-Number of 
military 
installations 
in the 
district
Black -
number of 
persons 
identifying 
as African 
American
Blue Collar 
- number 
of “blue 
collar 
workers in 
district
Transportation 
- number of 
persons 
identifying 
employment 
as 
transportation 
and public 
utilities
Black -
number of 
persons 
identifying 
as African 
American
Unemployed -
number of 
persons 
identified as 
unemployed
Rural -
population 
living in 
rural farm 
area
Major 
Military -
number of 
major 
military 
installations 
in the 
district
Bank - bank 
assets in 
state-
millions
Union -
percent 
unionized 
in state
Wholesale 
Retail -
number of 
persons 
identifying 
employment 
as wholesale 
or retail trade
City -
labeled 1 
if district
contained 
on of fifty 
largest 
cities
Tranport -
number of 
persons 
identifying 
employment as 
transportation 
and public 
utilities
Military 
Population
City -
labeled 1 if 
district 
contained 
one of fifty 
largest cities
Median -
median 
family 
income in 
the district
Urban -
population 
living in 
Urban 
Area
Flood - flood 
potential for 
district
Unemployed 
- number of 
persons 
identified as 
unemployed
Enroll -
number of 
persons 
enrolled in 
public 
elementary 
and high 
schools
Construction -
number of 
persons 
identifying 
employment in 
construction
Urban -
population 
living in 
Urban Area
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Table 3:
Committee Requests in the House of Representatives from 1947-1997 as Predicted 
by Prior Occupation
Committee
Request
Agriculture Armed 
Services
Banking, 
Finance 
and 
Urban 
Affairs
Education 
and
Labor
Judiciary Public
Works and
Transportation
Agriculture
Occupation
8.51***
(3.51)
.81
(.53)
4.77
(3.77)
1.64
(.87)
1.42
(.94)
3.12
(1.90)
Rank 
Solider
1.15
(.24)
2.16**
(.51)
1.19
(.27)
1.15
(.33)
1.36
(.34)
1.03
(.30)
Military 
Officer
1.04
(.27)
2.09**
(.53)
1.18
(.29)
1.04
(.48)
1.48
(.33)
1.06
(.33)
Bank, 
Finance
Occupation
1.38
(.45)
1.30
(.37)
2.84**
(1.18)
.13
(.85)
1.07
(1.18)
1.40
(.45)
Education 
and Labor
Occupation
2.90
(1.49)
1.11
(.41)
2.73
(.46)
12.46***
(4.54)
1.21
(1.18)
1.29
(.48)
Judiciary
Occupation
1.28
(.29)
-.17
(.24)
1.19
(.31)
1.99
(1.47)
11.19***
(6.84)
1.50
(.32)
Public 
Works and 
Trans.
Occupation
.99
(.70)
-.41
(.63)
.97
(1.08)
1.57
(1.12)
.31
(.85)
3.69
(.58)
N=999
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of requesting a 
committee when moving from an Interior occupation. The standard errors are in parenthesis below the 
coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 4:
Agricultural Committee Requests in the House of Representatives from 1947-1997 
Member and District 
Characteristics
Coefficient 
City .36*
(.66)
Farmer 1.00**
(.00)
Rural Farmland .99
(.00)
Previous Occupation in Agriculture 2.85***
(.80)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of
requesting a committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors 
are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 5:
Armed Services Committee Requests in the House of Representatives from 1947-
1997 
Member and District 
Characteristics
Coefficient 
Military Installations .97
(.15)
Major Military Installations 1.83**
(.31)
Military Population 1.00**
(.00)
Previously a Ranked Solider 2.74***
(.86)
Previously a Military Officer 3.02**
(1.19)
Constant -3.30**
(1.78)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of
requesting a committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors 
are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 6:
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee Requests in the House of 
Representatives from 1947-1997 
Member and District 
Characteristics
Coefficient 
Banks -9.38
(4.52)
City -.74
(.60)
Finance -.06
(.00)
Unemployment -.05
(.00)
Union .06**
(.02)
Urban 9.67**
(3.90)
Black .01***
(.00)
Previously a Ranked Solider .86*
(.48)
Previous Occupation in Banking, 
Finance or Urban Affairs
1.58**
(.68)
Previous Occupation in Judiciary .92*
(.51)
Constant -4.8**
(1.92)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of requesting a 
committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors are in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7:
Education and Labor Committee Requests in the House of Representatives from 
1947-1997 
Member and District Characteristics Coefficient 
Blue Collar Jobs .06**
(.00)
School Enrollment -.05**
(.00)
Median Income .02*
(.00)
Unemployed -.03***
(.00)
Union .04
(.03)
Previous Occupation in Education or 
Labor
3.33**
(1.12)
Previous Occupation in Judiciary 1.91**
(.93)
Previously a Military Officer -1.7*
(.93)
Constant -4.25**
(2.7)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of requesting a 
committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors are in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 8:
Energy and Commerce Committee Requests in the House of Representatives from 
1947-1997 
Member and District 
Characteristics
Coefficient 
Blue Collar Jobs .04*
(.00)
Median Income .02***
(.00)
Transportation -.06
(.00)
Unemployed -.01**
(.00)
Wholesale Retail Jobs -8.22
(.04)
Previous Occupation in Energy or 
Commerce 
-.97
(.69)
Previous Occupation in Judiciary .79**
(.42)
Constant -1.62**
(1.54)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of requesting a 
committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors are in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 9:
Judiciary Committee Requests in the House of Representatives from 1947-1997 
Member and District 
Characteristics
Coefficient 
Black 5.17
(8.22)
Blue Collar Jobs .09***
(.00)
City -.93
(.86)
School Enrollment -.07***
(.00)
Median Income .03*
(.00)
Urban 6.98
(5.71)
Previously a Ranked Solider 1.29*
(.68)
Previous Occupation in Judiciary 1.56**
(.79)
Constant -4.23
(2.3)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of requesting a 
committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors are in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 10:
Public Works and Transportation Requests in the House of Representatives from 
1947-1997 
Member and District Characteristics Coefficient 
Blue Collar Jobs .05**
(.00)
School Enrollment -.03**
(.00)
Flood .04
(.02)
Median Income .03***
(.00)
Transportation .02
(.00)
Unemployment -.01**
(.00)
Union .05**
(.02)
Previous Public Works and 
Transportation Occupation
21.5
NS(?)
Previously a Military Officer -1.2**
(.60)
Constant -2.18**
(1.98)
N=634
The baseline committee is Interior; therefore all the coefficients represent the odds ratio of requesting a 
committee when moving from an Interior committee request. The standard errors are in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. 
P<.001 ***, P<.05** and P<.010* (two-tailed tests) 
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